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Almost all financial transactions and personal data is nowadays online. A 
world with easy access to data and finances simplifies everyday life. Matters can 
be handled at ease where ever there is an internet connection. Contacting others 
can be done in ways unimaginable a decade or two ago. Instant messaging apps 
and video meetings bring the whole world close when working. If an end user 
finds something hard to handle they start sabotaging it with their personal 
behavior. They use less secure methods to keep their data secure because it is 
more convenient.  
The world of software security is a balancing act between designing features 
secure enough and being able to verify the functionality of secure features 
against malicious attackers and making secure features usable. Usability improves 
the chances that the end user complies to use of every day security. Designing 
features secure enough to fight against malicious attackers has gained too large 
proportion of the effort. According to literature reviewed in this thesis usability 
of the secure features has not been seen as a priority. 
This thesis examines usability and verifiability of secure features and methods. 
It is important to study the usability in this context, as better usability will allow 
secure features to appeal to a larger end user base, and adding the overall 
security. It will go through typical authentication methods and assesses their 
usability based on literature about usability and every day observations. It follows 
a high-level approach to secure features to be able to see what an end user 
encounters when using secure features. This is done to better evaluate the 
usability of the features. Especially when specifications are not fully available. 
The thesis also introduces a formal testing process structure that can be used 
as a guideline in planning and executing tests for any software feature. Helpful 
toolsets to aid in creating functional test environments and support functions are 
presented. The thesis introduces different kinds of existing and future method 
that will make security and usability of the authentication  
methods better.  
Keywords and terms: authentication methods, security, usability, testing, test 
automation  
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1. Introduction 
With this thesis, the author studies literature in the international and 
national community about the usability of secure features. The current state of 
usability of the secure features is illuminated along with biggest challenges of it. 
Furthermore, improvement suggestions for the situation are presented. In 
addition to that the author introduces essential processes and tools for testing 
secure features. This thesis studies usability and verification of secure features 
and methods. 
What has been often notified is that the usability of secure features is not 
an interest for people who implement them [Dhillon et al. 2009] The goals of 
secure feature design are set on what kind of security level in product should 
achieve. Some common interfaces towards the end user are implemented 
without a thought of how usable they are. The focus is on the implementation of 
the parts of the feature that are invisible to the end user. What this results in is 
that people refuse to use the full protection offered by secure features. Improving 
usability will result in more secure end user devices. According to the studies 
referred in this thesis this is due to the fact that the end users tend not to use 
obstructive secure methods if they can avoid it. 
The secure features and methods studied in this thesis are authentication 
methods. They are universal and they have also been affected a lot by a switch 
towards mobile handheld devices. The usability of the methods have stayed 
relatively unchanged even though the environment where they are used is totally 
different. Personal Identification (PIN) code for example was once entered to an 
Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) machine or at the privacy of one’s own home 
with a computer. Now mobile carry everywhere devices are used in the middle of 
the rush hour traffic in the public transport. Tabletop devices simply cannot be 
used without being observed by others in the same space. 
1.1 Research Questions and Methods 
This thesis answers on following research questions 
  1. What are the aspects of the good usability? 
Secure features and authentication methods part examines 
literature about usability to form a view that is considered to be 
a good usability. This subject is further examined throughout the 
thesis. Usability may also contain subjective aspects that cannot 
be assessed here. 
 
  
 
2 
2. How to approach to a new feature that is supposed to be tested?
How a new feature is approached from a testing perspective? 
What are the tools that are being used? What is test automation? 
These are covered in the vefification of secure features part. 
  3. How to improve usability and security of secure features?  
This is linked to answers to question 2. To answer one of the 
questions will also partially answer the another. 
There is a need for thesis to clarify the process of getting to know secure 
feature in a process where the feature is seen for the first time and no 
specification is available, and verifying the functionality of it. This is one of the 
key points of the thesis and I need to enforce the tester mindset all the way 
through the thesis. Another thing is to take a critical look into one essential part 
of the quality assurance that is the usability of secure features.  
Research methods chosen were to do a combination of research thesis and a 
hands-on user guide like approach for the reader. Literature review was done to 
research the subject further and to understand the phenomena. Furthermore, it 
was performed to get a clear view of the current state of the research done in the 
field of usability in secure features. 
The hands-on part consists of designing, creating and up keeping the test 
process with tools needed for verifying secure features. That part of the thesis 
could be utilized for creating a testing environment for any given target feature. 
Verification of the features is also an important part of ensuring the usability. 
Literature review examines studies and theses on security and usability point 
of views. The first main selector for selecting literature for this review has been 
an attempt to find literature about the key aspects of the thesis. Search words 
included usability, secure features and software testing. Then the sources were 
further selected based on the availability of the sources. Main sources of literature 
selected were acquired through the University of Tampere electronic library 
services. Materials regarding security e.g. Loberg [2004], Nalam [2015] were easy 
to find. Furthermore, usability as such is widely covered. The methods covered in 
the scope of this thesis, the authentication methods, were easy to find. During 
initial literature search it was noticed that the combination of two or more of 
these subjects was hard to find. The literature found from the combination of the 
issues suggested the same in their own studies. Main database for literature used 
in this thesis was ACM Digital Library. When searching ACM database with usable 
security search words 244 different hits were produced. Usability and 
authentication provided 14221 hits.  Some key literature pieces were also 
received from thesis supervisors. 
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In the process of literature review itself sources were first evaluated for their 
usability for the scope of this thesis. Then not so relevant sources were quickly 
browsed through searching for possible information. The relevant sources were 
inspected more thoroughly. Key books in the usability and security field were 
thoroughly read through as they served two purposes. They were used for this 
thesis and also in other studies. Notes about the key issues were written down 
during the review process and for some parts revisited after reading. 
Time used for the literature review cannot be assessed easily since the review 
was done in iterations. The first initial search round took a few days. More and 
more comprehensive checks of the literature were then taken during the whole 
thesis process as the subject matter became more familiar after each step. 
1.2 Summary of Key Concepts 
Authentication as a term in computer science describes a process where the 
end users establish their identity to a system. Methods used include use of a 
password or possession of a physical device, e.g. an OTP (One Time Password) 
generator. In case of a reverse authentication, the system authenticates itself to 
the end user, e.g. digital certificates in web services [Butterfield and Ngongi. 
2016].  Authentication in the scope of this thesis refers to authentication of the 
personal identity. It refers to give the proof that the service user is the one that is 
supposed to use it. 
Authentication methods are used to prove that a user is eligible to use the 
service. There are different types of authentication methods. They may require 
manual interaction with service’s graphical user interface. Methods in the scope 
of this thesis are services that require this kind of interaction. They benefit from 
the best possible usability and are therefore relevant to the scope of this thesis. 
The authentication methods also provide an easy way to start learning testing of 
unknown methods. 
Identity refers to proofing the identification of the user. Identifying is giving 
a proof that the user is allowed to access the service. Identity theft happens when 
someone steals personal information to use it to commit a crime, usually a fraud. 
Using a stolen identity, it is possible to open up bank accounts, get loans and 
even propose to be a different person when getting caught committing a crime 
[Loberg. 2004]. It is vital that our personal information is kept as safe as possible. 
Introducing more usable secure features can introduce them to a wider user base.  
Security refers to protection against unauthorized access to information or 
protection against intentional but unauthorized removal or alteration of that 
information. Security acts against both unintentional as well as deliberate 
attempts to access sensitive information [Butterfield and Ngongi. 2016]. 
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Usability refers to design user interfaces in attempt to make them intuitive 
and easy to use [Butterfield and Ngongi. 2016]. Usability in general applies to all 
products that are meant to be used by humans.  
Verification is verifying accuracy of the information [Butterfield and Ngongi. 
2016]. In this thesis, the information verified is the intended functionality of the 
examined secure features against their specifications. 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
This thesis studies usability and verifiability of authentication methods. 
Verifiability differs from verification that in verifiability it is unknown at the start 
what is the level of verification can be done to the feature. The thesis takes a 
high-level approach to the secure features to be able to see what the end users 
see when they are using the features. The high-level as opposite to low-level is 
the application layer that the end users see when doing everyday operations with 
operating system’s user interface. The usability is chosen as a focus because 
secure features are used on every day basis by regular people. 
Chapter 2 examines secure features and authentication methods. The 
theoretical phase of authentication process is at first described. Then different 
authentication methods are separately examined and usability of the secure 
features is evaluated using available methods. 
Chapter 3 contains a literature review of usability and secure features. It also 
includes recommendations and future improvement aspects of improving both 
end user experience and security of authentication methods. 
In Chapter 4 these authentication methods are studied from a formal testing 
process perspective and testing aspects are explained to the reader. The process 
is split to logical chunks. The testing aspect is opened up more by examining the 
test automation and the virtualization toolsets. Negative cases where the security 
is tried to be breached are addressed. Since trying out all possible outcomes is 
really labor intensive tools to automate the security breaches are introduced. 
Chapter 5 of the thesis is for evaluating thesis content validity against other 
available research material. It evaluates the contribution of this thesis to its         
research field against other research in the field and gives recommendations for 
future studies for this area. Personal insights of the thesis process and the field 
of study area are also described. 
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2. Secure Features and Authentication Methods 
In this chapter, different types of authentication techniques used for secure 
identification are studied closer.  Authentication is used to secure personal data 
and finances. Authentication methods analyzed here have been selected to be 
ones that need the end user interaction with the secure service. Interactive 
functions of this type are interesting in the usability point of view. 
2.1 Secure Features 
Software security is an idea implemented to protect software against 
malicious attack and other hacker risks so that the software continues to function 
correctly under the potential risk. 
Secure feature is usually implemented so that it only accepts the intended 
inputs and depending on the input it results in an outcome. It is protected against 
unintended inputs. E.g. a PIN code entering interface only accepts numbers and 
a limited amount of numbers to reduce the risk of unintended outcome. 
2.2 Authentication and Authorization of Identity 
Authentication to system can be split to three stages [Zylkarnain et al. 2013]. 
Identification is the part of the authentication process where an identity is 
provided to the system regardless of the result of the authentication. In next 
phase the system assesses the authentication by given password and if they are 
proven correct grants authorization to system. Some of the methods described 
here have all three stages in use. Some only ask for authentication and then either 
authorize the user to use the system or denials authorization. In the last stage the 
access to the system is either granted or denied. 
Existing authentication methods involve three basic factors [FFIEC. 2018]: 
• Something the end user knows, e.g. password or Personal 
Identification Number code. 
• Something the end user has, e.g. One Time Password tokens, password 
lists etc. 
• Something the end user is, e.g. biometric characters such as fingerprint 
Depending on the level of authentication rounds authentication is either a 
standard authentication (one foctor) or two-stage authentication (two-factor). In 
the first one a single authentication input is required and in the latter there are 
two different authentication methods combined. 
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2.3 Authentication Methods 
Authentication methods are covered here starting from mobile 
authentication methods and then for reference some other usable features are 
covered. 
2.3.1 PIN code 
A PIN (Personal Identification Number) code has been used as a verifier of 
the owner since introduction of credit card. ISO-9654—1 standard [ISO          
standards. 2017] defines a PIN code to be a 4 to 12-digit code that is used as a 
password to identify the owner of the credit card or a service. 
In automatic teller machines (ATM) and internet banking services PIN code 
gives user the right to withdraw money or complete financial transactions.  Code 
is usually four digits in length. In mobile phones PIN code gives access to use the 
SIM card. The length of SIM PIN code is restricted between four and eight digits. 
The additional security definition for SIM PIN code is that the end user can only 
try to enter wrong SIM PIN code three times and then the SIM card is locked. 
PIN is widely known, understood and used method. The relative safety of it is 
more linked towards user behavior of not showing it to others. PIN code may 
refer to the SIM PIN code that is used to unlock the SIM card, or it may refer to 
the PIN code that is used to unlock the screen. 
When addressing the usability of the PIN code inserting an Android OS 
mobile phone is used as an example. How can the PIN code be changed by the 
end user? 
The end user needs to find a wheel symbol somewhere in the device menu. 
Alternative method is to locate the wheel symbol from the drop-down menu by 
dragging it down from the upper part of the screen. The Android interface is 
designed to give the end user many ways of entering the settings. The wheel is 
now located and can be pressed. 
Press wheel -> Settings opens -> locate and press “Security”, it may or may 
not have a lock icon also -> Security menu opens -> Sim Card Lock Settings -> 
Change SIM PIN. When you get to this part of the menu, the existing SIM PIN 
code may be required when getting to the change menu. 
Can that procedure be considered easy and usable? How easily reproducible 
that method is when it is needed next time six months from now? Questions 
about the usability of settings in Android have been raised. 
How does one usually find the menu where this change is done if haven’t read 
this thesis in the last 30 minutes? Usually it is googled. “Changing SIM PIN code 
android” gives about four million answers right away. This is not a scientific 
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method. But judging from experience if there are four million hits instantly found 
for the problem, then it is shared by many people. 
2.3.2 Password 
Using password is a similar method to the PIN code for unlocking the device. 
A password is a set of characters that the end user inputs when doing 
authentication. The main difference is that it may include also alphabets and 
special characters. 
The password gives way more variability in settings. Password can be set to 
certain lengths e.g. 4-16 characters. The passwords can be simple where all given 
characters are accepted. An example of an easy password is a word that means 
something. When a complexity requirement is added it usually means that the 
password needs to include alphabets combined with number(s) and special 
character(s). 
Ease of use need to be considered when an end user is restricted to give a 
complex password. It is more demanding to insert a complex password than just 
to type few numbers like the PIN code. 
Changing and setting the password can be as hard as changing the PIN code. 
In addition, depending on the settings there can be a need to set a complex 
password. The task of typing and changing constantly complex password can be 
hard to type using computer, let alone using a mobile device touch screen virtual 
keyboard.  
2.3.3 Password Lists  
A subcategory of authentication PIN code and password is password list 
that is used by banking sites as a 2nd factor authentication method. It is usually 
a physical document handed out to a specific user. 
The end user is asked to authenticate him/herself with a named password 
from the list, this list is only available for that particular user. Some applications 
can also send the password request to the mobile phone requesting the end user 
to give it to online application.  
2.3.4 Fingerprint 
The fingerprint is a unique identifier used by mobile devices today. 
Fingerprints as such are secure [Jo et al. 2016].  
They do create another possible security issue if the personal fingerprint 
identifiers are exported outside of the end user’s mobile device for some 
malicious purpose. 
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Using fingerprint to log in to the devices requires trust towards the software 
provider. This kind of unique identifier could easily be used for tracking the life 
outside the proposed scope. 
Although fingerprint is a good and usable authentication method for the 
most part it is not without issues. Users with wet hands usually have issues with 
fingerprint scanners. In Finland using fingerprint scanner after sauna does not 
usually work due to skin wrinkles. It is also not usable method for people with 
certain types of handicap or a profession that is hard on the skin of the fingertip.  
Fingerprint scanners work usually quite poorly in these circumstances. If there 
is only one factor authentication with alternative password this might not be an 
issue. But mobile systems these days may require a two-factor authentication and 
an issue may result in not being able to access the device or even wiping the data 
inside the device. Severity of the unsuccessful authentication depends on the 
device settings and in corporate world they usually are not configurable by the 
end user. 
2.3.5 Facial Recognition 
Facial recognition authenticates the end user with unique facial features. 
Technical implementation of the feature varies a lot. Traditional methods take 
a picture of the end user and compare pictures. Apple has announced an infrared 
camera module that actually measures the end users facial structure and uses it 
for recognition [Forbes. 2017]. In the method where picture is taken the system 
could be fooled by using picture of the owner. The traditional methods of facial 
recognition are based on the implementation of taking the correct picture and 
then when doing a facial recognition, a mathematical basic comparison is done 
to analyze the percentage difference between pictures. That presents a problem. 
Since only the two dimensions are taken into account there is a change that some 
systems can be fooled with showing the picture of the device owner.  
The usability of the feature is acceptable since just a glance of the face should 
be enough to identify the end user. Putting on a hat, glasses or growing a beard 
is really problematic with traditional facial recognition in addition of security 
issues. 
The new 3D scan introduced with iOS 11 intends to prevent these issues 
described when using the iPhone X [Forbes. 2017].  Apple Face ID is replacing 
TouchID in iPhoneX.  Enablers of Face ID are the TrueDepth came and new 
powerful processor of the product. System operates by measuring and analyzing 
over 30 000 invisible dots and creates a depth map of users face instead of a 
picture. System is designed to open the device when the end user takes a look 
into it. This facial map is only stored into the device and not in any cloud based 
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solution. Face ID is supposed to solve issues with reliability and also with glasses 
and hats that have plagued the traditional systems. Theoretically if the system 
works it should recognize the end user’s facial features even if a disguise is used. 
There is a limited real life experiences for this technology. 
The facial recognition there is a trust issue between the end user and the 
software provider. If both fingerprint and the facial recognition are done 
adequately to give the user a unique identifier, that identifier could be used to 
identify them also in the other places. Keeping this data safe is really important. 
2.3.6 Two-Factor Authentication 
Two-Factor authentication is a two-stage authentication method. One 
implementation of two-factor is password list presented earlier. Theoretically it 
can be a combination of any of methods presented earlier. 
There are some proprietary solutions for two-factor authentication. One of 
the most notable solution is implemented by Apple [How does Apple’s new face 
id work. 2017]. Unlike the SMS based methods, a six-number code is sent to one 
of the end user’s other Apple device that is linked to the Apple ID account. A pop 
up then opens requesting that is signing from this location acceptable? If the 
answer is yes, the code is shown and can be inserted to the interface pop up in 
the new device.  
Although this is totally a proprietary solution by Apple, devices by some other 
manufacturers are included as a part of this. A new Microsoft Windows running 
machine with iCloud enabled can be used with two-factor. 
Other common solution to implement two-factor is to use an SMS to send 
the authentication code to the end users mobile device. The security of SMS 
protocol is from the 80’s and it is not safe [Brandon. 2017]. If one has a malicious 
mindset, an own intercepting cell phone mast can be easily created and send all 
traffic through it. A device named IMSI()-catcher [Ooi. 2015] can be deployed with 
a relatively low cost to identify as a real cell phone mast. But the device actually 
intercepts all mobile phone communication and then forwards it to the correct 
mast, and the end user sees no difference in mobile phone usage.  
A sample device has been built around a regular laptop for 1500 USD, where 
the laptop price was the biggest cost of the build. 
2.3.7 One Time Password (OTP) Tokens 
One Time Password token that is used as a second factor of the 
authentication process is usually created with external hardware that shows a 
token that changes in regular intervals. Hardware implementations of this 
approach include RSA ID token generator [RSA. 2017] that is carried with the user 
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where log in is needed. After the initial login has occurred the current state of 
token is checked from the token generator and entered to secondary login. 
The OTP password token login method is based on calculating the token from 
unique seeds that are either put to the hardware that is used by the end user. 
They are shared to the end user and end user can use software solutions such as 
MobileID [Deepnet security. 2017] downloadable from Apple App Store to 
generate the tokens from the seed in real time. 
From the security point of view, OTP tokens increase the security. They are 
invulnerable to replay attacks since the OTP can never be guessed with repetitive 
attempts. The only ways to compromise this security approach is to first find out 
the original user id and password and the then implement a method of finding 
out the true OTP. 
The usability of this approach varies from a little annoying to constant harm. 
It is a little annoyance to check and enter the token every once in a while, but 
entering constantly changing token many times a day is not usable. 
2.3.8 Peripheral Device Recognition 
Peripheral device recognition is one of the second factors in two factor 
authentications. It is implemented by physical existing hardware of the end user. 
Existing hardware might be a smart phone or an iPod etc. The end user then plugs 
the device into the computer when logging procedure is in progress. The usability 
benefits for the end user are the same than in the one-time password solution 
done by application that the end user doesn’t need to carry around external piece 
of hardware just to get logged into some service. 
2.4 Password Storage Options 
To help the user with using many different passwords in many different sites 
the manufacturers of operating systems and browsers have different kind of 
general storages available for handling lists of different passwords at a safe place. 
The security of these solutions has been challenged. These kinds of solutions 
increase usability of the end user drastically but are they safe? We examine some 
publicly raised issues concerning them to raise awareness. 
2.4.1 Browser Password Storage 
The contemporary browsers solutions are examined closer here. These 
password storages are similar to keychains covered later but they are tied to the 
used browser. 
Opera offers the Password Sync service where the end users passwords can 
be synchronized between all devices where which logged in and using Opera. 
The service operates by setting the user an account data to company’s own 
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servers and it accesses data from there. In 2016 that server was breached 
according to announcement done by company itself [Opera. 2017]. 
Announcement says that 0,5% of all Opera users are using the service, passwords 
were stored encrypted but they are reset as a precaution. 
Another real issue associated with a local password manager in recent years 
was when Google Chrome password manager could be entered to see the plain 
text passwords by others. This was enabled if the end user left the browser on 
and left from the proximity of the device for a while. Password storage can be 
found at: chrome://settings/passwords 
2.4.2 Keychains 
MacOS and Windows computers offer a keychain as an operating system 
service to the customers using the computer. The idea of the keychain is to offer 
a machine wide safe password storage for using all applications in the machine. 
E.g. when using the same network service with two different browsers the service 
recognizes that the end user is trying to log into the service and offers a saved 
password to be used to log in to the service. In MacOS the keychain usability 
from end user point of view is fluent.  
How secure are these keychains which have an ability to store all of the 
delegate passwords? The safety of MacOS keychain has been proven to have 
vulnerabilities [Apple Insider.  2017]. What this presented vulnerability can do is 
that an unsigned app designed by anyone that has the software development 
skills can ask for plain text keywords from the keychain. In a proven concept, the 
social media passwords could be extracted out of the computer that way. That 
could also be done without user knowing it. 
When keychains are analyzed for their usability alone they increase the 
usability of other software also. If the end user has saved e.g. the passwords used 
for Wi-Fi to one of the devices then when the end user enters into the same space 
the other device also connects to that Wi-Fi without any interaction from the end 
user. 
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3. Usability and Secure Features 
This chapter covers usability and secure features as they are covered in the 
published literature. 
3.1 Literature in the Usability Field 
Norman [2013] has an interesting perspective to everyday objects. It makes 
a bold claim that if there is a concurring problem in using some normal item, the 
problem is with the design of the item and not the user. 
Norman [2013] examines door handles closely. The book suggests that if the 
door is only meant to open towards outside it might as well have a metal plate 
instead of the handle. Then the interface would better indicate what it is meant 
to be used for.  
Norman [2103] introduces six principles of evaluating the usability of a 
product: visibility, feedback, constraints, mapping, consistency and affordances.  
Visibility refers to that end users need to know instantly their options in using the 
product/feature. Feedback is a reaction to end users action. Constrains are the 
physical limitations of the product. Mapping refers to the relationship of control 
and effect. Consistency is the need that same action produces same effect every 
time a feature/product is used in a similar way. Affordance is the relationship 
between what something looks like and how it's used. The applications of these 
principles shape the thinking of the reader. 
Although Norman [2013] does not involve security features it aids in 
understanding the design from the end user perspective. Reading the book alters 
the mindset of its reader to re-assess daily failures with everyday objects 
differently. It raised questions like “why is this done like this?”. This book is really 
relevant learning material for usability side of the thesis. 
Human Computer Interface and its history has been covered in McKenzie 
[2013] The book starts from the early days of computing with text based user 
interfaces with really limited ways of interaction. Original computer user interface 
has evolved starting from text based command line interpreters to the graphical 
user interfaces. Graphical user interfaces apply what you see is what you get 
interpretation of the interface. The actions in the user interface are made to 
resemble the real life interactions, e.g. dragging a document to the trash bin.  It 
also embraces the concept of thorough testing of the product. The book 
measures adoption rates and error rates of different input methods. 
3.2 Studies Related to Secure Features and Usability 
Cranor and Garfinkel [2005] describe usability aspects in an attempt to get 
the reader to think the concept of usability before implementing secure features. 
  
 
13 
It is focuses on human centric secure feature design than the specific technical 
details. However, the knowledge covered in the books found with literature 
search are from the time when there was no smartphone and instant messaging 
apps. Moreover, the books do not include how the features and properties of any 
authentication method can be tested and verified. 
Sasse and Flechais [2005] examine usability of secure features. It examines the 
old security expert’s mindset of people being the weakest link in security. While 
that might be true it is often offered as an excuse for not usable secure features. 
Evidence of secure features not being usable is presented. Book puts human in 
the center of implementing secure features. The aspects of human nature that 
affect to the use of the features are closely examined. The new mindset should 
be to comply to the human factors in the secure feature design. 
Sasse and Flechais [2005] examines human nature by thinking of how the 
need for protecting one’s own property has evolved through times. This socio-
economical view helps readers to understand better the often-complicated 
nature of secure features. The secure features are a need based implementation 
but they answer to the need for the availability of the protection itself and not 
usually to the usability. Then it links the study content to today’s world and 
electronic ways to communicate and do transactions. 
Sasse and Flechais [2005] find out two main reasons for not wanted human  
behavior using secure features. Either humans do not know how to use secure 
features or they choose not to use them. Both the factors can be linked to poor 
end user experience of secure features. First is complexity of a feature. Second in 
my opinion is worse. There is a secure feature that end user knows how to use 
and could use it to improve the overall security. Instead he/she chooses not to 
use it and sabotages the security of the service or device.  
This behavior is linked to the fact that using some secure features is hard and 
time consuming. It is easier not to use them. The study concludes that most 
people can’t comply with the password standards set those days. Reasons for that 
mentioned are remembering a large number of passwords, the password 
complexity requirements and the demand to change them often. This paper is 
really useful for creating ground knowledge of the research subject. 
In the paper by Dillon et al. [2016] study the reasons why security and usability 
aspects are often overlooked in defining the software features. Claim is made that 
they are not considered as strategically important parts of the features. The paper 
tries to identify value based changes to usability using a survey and analyzing the 
results. The paper continues in the lines set by Sasse and Flechais and they both 
combined give a coherent look of the state of the secure feature design. 
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In the comparative study based on national culture and gender [Berki et al. 
2017] of cyber-security knowledge in higher education institutes is performed. 
Knowledge level of cyber-security plays important role in the use of security.  
Study examines five different countries: China, Finland, Greece, Nepal, and the 
UK.  Main focus for secure feature part is to examine knowledge related to cloud 
service security. 
Other relevant part of the paper [Berki et al. 2017] is to examine how different 
cultures affect the situation. It suggests that the educators of cloud security 
should consider these factors when designing solutions:  incorporating real needs 
and taking into account cultural awareness in higher education degrees and 
corresponding industrial training schemes.  
The comparative study examines the adoption rate of cloud services of people 
from different cultures. Study reveals that 20,45% of people who do not use cloud 
services don’t use it because they do not trust services, and 18,94% of people 
participating this study don’t use cloud services. If we consider that 20% is divided 
with five we get that about 4% of the participants in this five country study don’t 
trust cloud services. Study combines the security field with cultural differences. It 
is important to broaden understanding that end users of secure services are not 
all alike. There are some built in assumptions that come from the culture that 
affect the way secure features are used. 
3.3 Studies on Improving Usability and Security of Authentication Methods 
To reduce physical carry around proprietary devices for OTP (One Time 
Password) creating they can be replaced with mobile phone apps. Apps like 
Deepnet MobileID [Deepnet security. 2017] depicted in Figure 1 let users use the 
device they already have to create authentication one time passwords instead of 
carrying proprietary token generators with them. A traditional OTP generator 
such as RSA SecurID [2017] depicted in figure 2 generates keys that are visible 
for all that have access to the device. 
Mobile device itself most likely has some sort of authentication method of its 
own and further adds the security of the use of OTP.  
In addition to usual OTP generators, the app provides patented the two-way 
authentication that authenticates both the end user to the service and the service 
to the end user.  Seeds are fed to the device app and after that to access the 
Deepnet Security app is simply opened from the end users unlocked mobile 
phone. RSA SecurID token generator usually hangs in the keychain or together 
with a badge on the end users neck. RSA also offers software token solutions for 
mobile devices. 
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Figure 1. Deepnet Mobile ID app [Deepnet security. 2017] 
 
 
Figure 2. RSA SecurID token generator [RSA. 2017] 
 
New methods are developed for the two-factor authentication where the 
second factor is a picture taken with a mobile phone camera of an everyday 
feature the end user possesses. The taken picture is used to replace One Time 
Password. Pixie [Cimpanu. 2017] is one of these future systems that analyze the 
picture taken. In the method, a reference picture is taken by the end user and 
initial log in using text password is done. Then when in authentication end user 
retakes the picture and an app in the mobile device compares the pictures. Basic 
security of the picture taking is that object only known by the end user. Security 
of the method can be further added by taking the picture from a certain angle 
only known by the end user. 
Harmonizing UI towards universal experience on similar authentication 
situations in the whole device range between manufacturers would assist the 
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familiarity of the features. The user experience improvements by familiarity 
encourages users to use secure authentication methods. 
One of the problems associated with mobile device touch screens is the ease 
of shoulder surfing the passwords: A method used to acquire password or some 
similar other method of user authentication. PIN code entering, drawn patterns 
and password entering are especially vulnerable for this.  
There are two useful paths in overcoming this issue both security and usability 
wise. First is the increasing the use of fingerprint reader that creates a unique 
authentication that can’t be shoulder surfed. Other usable methods include the 
use of facial recognition. As examined in Chapter 2 all facial recognition methods 
may not be so secure. Apple’s FaceID promises to get security aspects into 
acceptable level by measuring 30 000 facial point and creating a map of users 
face. To  increase usability it attempts to adapt to users changing facial hair and 
hats etc. 
There are also promising studies about creating usable secure authentication 
methods to touch screen that are effective against shoulder surfing. Multi-Touch 
Authentication on Tabletops [Kim et al. 2010] is one of these future looking 
studies. It focuses into the issue of tabletop interfaces where password entry 
discreetly is virtually impossible. It tries to solve an almost impossible problem. 
How to limit visibility of the authentication only to the person who is doing the 
authentication in an environment where there is really limited privacy. The 
example methods from the study are shown below. A group of three persons at 
the time were selected and one of them was chosen to enter the authentication 
code that was only known by him/her and the other two were trying to acquire 
what the password entered was. It was noted during the study that these two 
people that were trying to solve password grouped proactively and compared 
notes to solve the password. The study sees this as a feasible situation in real life. 
The Shield PIN method depicted in Figure 3 only shows the PIN inserting 
keyboard when a palm hand covers the green area and so forces the user to 
shield the pin keyboard. 
The Slot PIN method in Figure 4 moves the inputs into rolling wheels in slots 
and it makes people around the end user harder to see what numbers are 
selected. 
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Figure 3. Shield PIN method [Kim et al. 2010] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Slot PIN method [Kim et al. 2010] 
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Figure 5. The Cue PIN method [Kim et al. 2010] 
 
The cue PIN method in Figure 5 shows a hidden row alphabet against which 
the PIN input must be lined. The row alphabet is only visible when hand covers 
the green area totally. 
 
Figure 6. Color-rings method [Kim et al. 2010] 
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      The Color-Rings method depicted in Figure 6 combines graphical and multi 
touch aspect to authentication. At first a user is asked to place four fingers into 
the display (ideally both thumbs and index fingers). Four rings of different colors 
are drawn around the fingers. The user must place four rings concurrently on top 
of the correct objects and confirm the location by releasing all fingers. To make 
the method secure only one of the rings is a correct one and others are decoys. 
Password guessing would require to find both the right ring and right objects. 
Multi touch pressure grids in Figure 7 are used to select the correct pictures 
and the selection is only visible to the giver of authentication since the hands stay 
stationary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Pressure grids method [Kim et al. 2010] 
 
These methods were all applied to the tabletop but e.g. shield PIN would be 
easy to replicate to mobile devices smaller screens. Also some kind of 
implementation for pressure as an authentication input method would be 
interesting. The Apple Corporation uses pressure sensitive touch screens in its 
contemporary mobile devices so the technology would already be in place for 
such a method.  
Also, replacing the drawn patterns with the color-rings method requiring 
multi touch use would improve security of the mobile phone authentication 
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without sacrificing too much usability. It is easy to shoulder surf anyone’s drawn 
pattern. 
The downside in using these two methods in a touch screen handheld device 
is the need for using two hands. Then user would need to place the device 
somewhere out of hands to operate these log in methods. 
3.4 Other Thesis Work Related to Security 
The following three thesis cover security area. Din Toan Nguyen’s MSc thesis 
[Nguyen. 2016] describes the importance of network security for security itself 
and also for the customer’s needs to be able to trust the network provider. It is a 
highly technical thesis that focuses mostly in describing the secure API calls. At 
first the most relevant commercial solutions are described and then self-made 
implementation is introduced. It is a well written thesis with deep technological 
knowledge. 
Thrushna Nalam's MSc Thesis [Nalam. 2015] is focused into RSS (Really Simple 
Syndication) that is an XML protocol for updating information. Thesis sees the 
decline of RSS use to be part of its security flaws that allow it to be used as a 
channel for SPAM. It shows deep technical knowledge about the subject. It 
includes the user experimenting part. 
Sunil Chaudhary's MSc Thesis [Chaudhary. 2012] focuses in the identification 
of phishing sites and attempts. It tries to identify anomalies in the Uniform 
Resource Locators (URLs) and phishing websites. And to determine an efficient 
way to employ those anomalies for the automated phishing detection.  
To accomplish this highly ambitious goal the author performs meta-analysis 
for current used phishing techniques. Then a wide set of actually found anomalies 
in phishing sites and their source code is examined with this new technique. 
During tests, it is notified that the key elements in discovering the existence of 
phishing site have been changed into different not-discoverable form. And those 
used markers are no longer effective in a fight against phishing attempts. 
The thesis takes a look into URL and DOM (Document Object Model) 
structures of phishing websites. It is interesting because of past front end testing 
projects. It is interesting to see similar occurrences in DOM structures between 
malicious sites. 
These three theses above have more technical approach to security field. They 
provide good reference how to write a security related thesis. The content itself 
differs from this thesis field. 
  
 
21 
3.5 Summary of Literature on Usability and Secure Features 
All the books, papers and thesis read about subject of security cover well 
the technical points of the process and go deep into the secure features in an 
attempt to improve overall security. The security field has attracted good thinkers 
with a lot of knowledge of the subject. The literature was in part chosen to get 
representation of all covered fields of the thesis.  
The field of end user experience of the secure features has little less coverage. 
Cranor and Garfinkel [2005] mention “It is easy to make a secure computer. Just 
lock a computer into a safe and throw away the key”. The books that are written 
about usability of secure features such as Sasse and Flechais [2005] offer some 
help in the field of it. Relevant theories regarding human psychology towards 
using secure features were presented. They helped forming overall 
understanding of the subject. Furthermore, explained own personal selections of 
secure features. 
Combining books that are strictly about usability and end user experience 
broadens the field of study to the right direction by providing more proven field 
of usability studies that can be applied to security features also. 
The books describing the relation between usability and security such as 
[Sasse and Flechais. 2005] and [Granor and Garfinkel. 2005] described a coherent 
display of the situation surrounding secure features. I did not find any papers or 
books about secure features that are considered usable by end user. 
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4. Verifying Secure Features 
Verification and also therefore the existence of overall security of features 
is studied in method level in this section. Often to be able to verify the existence 
of security intended features need to be tested in the happy mode. Try to be able 
to complete test scenarios where the end user just wants to use the device. On 
the other hand, when the actual protection is considered there is a need to learn 
the mindset of the malicious person. Good functionality increases usability. 
4.1 International Software Testing Qualifications Board 
International Software Testing Qualifications Board, ISTQB, certification [2017] 
provides clear structured reference material in applying methods to testing, test 
development and management. 
ISTQB certifications are used to define the  level of professionalism for experts 
working in the field of software testing. Levels include foundation certifications, 
the advanced level and the expert level. They are also split to agile, core and 
specialist levels. 
In the foundation level, there are many different kind of expertise certificate 
options available. The advanced level is then further  split into test designer and 
test manager levels and there is a separate path for different kinds of advanced 
professionals. Even if the certificate exam or the course(s) have not been taken 
the course materials are helpful in testing. Materials in the course section are 
divided into sections matching the different levels of certifications. 
In certification syllabus, process view of software testing of any software is 
elaborated. It is intended to gather scattered testing practices and processes of 
software testers to form a globally uniform testing process. This kind of uniform 
experience then adds professionalism to software testing. And also, it allows 
software testers around the world to understand the phases of the processes 
everywhere. 
ISTQB foundation is a non-profit organization that is formed in 2002. It is 
located in Belgium. The ISTQB Certified Tester has become the world leading 
certification to validate software testers. The work of the foundation is largely 
based into voluntary work by the software testing professionals. These volunteers 
then arrange certificate exams. In Finland, these exams are arranged by Finnish 
Software Testing Board [FiSTB. 2017]. In its pages FiSTB names its tasks as follows: 
arranging certification exams, organizing testing assembly seminars with 
cooperation with universities and guest lecturing. 
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4.2 Verifying the Existence of Functioning Security 
A secure feature as such is not meant to be visible to an end user. This also 
presents a challenge to be able to verify the existence of the secure feature when 
the feature’s specification is not available. An end user only notices security when 
it is working too well, e.g. preventing the intended use of software. 
To be able to verify the existence of functioning security, there is a need to 
first understand what is tested. The PIN code is referred in examples as a mobile 
phone password entry. Most of us are familiar with that feature and it is useful as 
an example. As with any given verifying task there is a need to follow a certain 
type of testing process. 
 
Verification flow for a new not known feature is given below: 
- Getting to know the product. Initial acquiring what a feature is 
supposed to do 
- Initial draft testing 
- Exploratory testing sessions 
- First actual test run 
- Finalizing tests 
- Planning for negative testing with a malicious mindset 
 
How this process is handled in a more structured way is to follow a process 
for testing described in Figure 8. The process is from top to bottom flowing 
diagram with possibility to return from certain phases. These steps are linked to 
the process. The selected method of testing a new feature is formed by using the 
ISTQB testing certificate process [2017] as a guideline. And then it is shaped 
towards the reality of the testing process. There is a plethora of books describing 
software testing processes in detail and they usually follow roughly the same 
processes that are also the base of the ISTQB testing process. 
This kind of process flow follows also the process guidelines that are studied 
in other testing related books like Effective Methods for Software Testing [Perry. 
2006] which follows the circle of plan, do, check, and act. It presents the same 
testing cycle but in a cyclical form not as an up-down list. The testing part was 
done to answer research question “What is functional security?” 
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Figure 8: Testing Process Flow 
4.2.1 Beginning 
What is the feature? Is there any knowledge about the feature? Possible 
sources for information for answering these questions are specifications and 
requirements. Information from requirement engineering course proved that 
good requirements help build good features. Long experience in SW 
development projects supports these findings. My personal career in SW testing 
is 13 years long. It includes Manual SW testing, test automation, test design, 
usability assessment and SW package releasing. Projects have varied from mobile 
phone development, banking, insurance, to process automation. A test engineer 
often finds itself in a situation where there really is not any documentation how 
something should work. This is often the case with all features in agile SW 
development practices. Furthermore, it is even more common with security 
features which are not in the center of the interest for most stakeholders. 
What is the feature supposed to do? How does the feature work? Are there 
limitations built in the feature? With security features this information often is not 
readily available and needs to be investigated by the test engineer. The test 
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engineer can often also affect the usability of features that are seen by the end 
user, e.g. the test engineer creates bugs, use cases and test cases to support 
understanding of verified features. 
4.2.2 Planning 
Exploratory testing is a way to get to know a feature that nothing is known 
about. The name exploratory testing may mislead. It is a controlled and 
preplanned testing effort. The test engineer needs to have a plan how to perform 
the session. The test charter should have a set time and should limit the field of 
testing effectively. An effective timeframe for executing an exploratory testing 
session is from 30 minutes to an hour. Then the tested feature is described. Notes 
are kept on all findings. 
After the test round is over findings are examined and based on those finding 
test cases can be further fine-tuned. And possible bugs can be logged into test 
management tool.  
Figure 9: Exploratory testing session charter document [Stickyminds. 2017] 
 
  
 
26 
In Figure 9 the upper part of the document describes the purpose and target 
of the exploratory testing session, starting from the issues detected during 
testing part and risks and tasks. This kind of charter document is formed 
combining the original charter with testing target and notes done during testing. 
Bug reports are written after testing. 
4.2.3 Analysis and Design 
The initial getting to know the feature part has been completed. The next 
logical step is to start forming initial draft test sets for the feature.  
Writing a test case has a universal structure that needs to be followed (terms 
in Figure 10 are in brackets): 
1. Prerequisites (Description) part describes what needs to be done before 
test execution starts. If a mobile device is considered, Device Under Test (DUT) 
needs to have SW installed, and is booted up to a certain state where 
performing the test is possible. In addition, a SIM card may be needed etc. 
2. Test steps (Test Details) describe the actual steps that run one by one and 
what is expected to happen after each step 
3. After the final step, the last part describes the expected result (In last step) 
i.e. what is supposed to have happened to the device when all steps of the test 
have been running. This is also called defining the exit criteria for a single test. 
Figure 10: A test case in the testing tool Zephyr [getzephyr.  2017] 
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4.2.4 Implementation 
These initially created tests are then used for the first actual test run. Tests 
are usually in a draft state then and findings are written down. There is a common 
exit criterion for the test run defined.  
For the defining part, it might be that all tests need to be run no matter 
what the results are. When testing continues with reoccurring test rounds rules 
evolve and usually become tighter. 
The first test run results are communicated to stakeholders. Communication 
is often overlooked in the testing process. But there is no point in testing in the 
first place if the results and findings are not communicated to everyone that 
benefits from them. A communication plan that is often made by the test 
manager describes in a clear way what is tested, what is the outcome and what 
are the bugs. The test manager communicates before the test round starts the 
data that is required from the test engineer for the test reporting. 
4.2.5 After Testing Process 
After the first run the findings are analyzed and tests are finalized to a non-
draft form. After this stage, the tests are ready to be run by any qualified test 
engineer. So, it is important to look at the tests as not an own personal creation 
but how someone else might understand them.  
Usually this stage will improve the prerequisites part so that anyone new to 
that particular test can look what needs to be done before that test can be run. 
Steps and expected outcome became more obvious.  
4.2.6 Control 
The control part in the testing flow is reserved for the test manager if there 
is a separate test manager. It is the responsibility of the test manager to oversee 
the operations. Usually communication and general test operations flow tools are 
operated by the test manager. The test manager assigns test assignments to the 
test engineers.  
4.2.7 Planning of Negative Test Cases 
The planning of negative test cases starts after verifying to agreed assurance 
that the feature actually works when used as intended. Negative test cases 
validate the feature against invalid inputs and user behavior. 
A useful way of doing negative testing development is to freely do trials of 
the interface capabilities. In Figure 11 there is a Google Pixel XL mobile phone’s 
PIN code entering interface. That current mobile phone is a really good example 
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since it uses unaltered Android OS version 8.0 Oreo interfaces everywhere (also 
called Vanilla Android). (Note before starting to investigate this feature, calling 
emergency number without a proper cause is illegal in many countries. 
It clearly states that the end user needs to enter PIN code of the SIM card, as 
shown in Figure 11.  
There is further info on the state of the SIM card - locked. Furthermore, a text  
says “emergency call”. The affordability of the interface looks clear so far.  
Figure 11: PIN code inserting interface for Google Pixel XL 
 
In this stage, the interface has been used in the positive cases and a correct 
PIN code has been entered and therefore the SIM card is unlocked. But what if 
an incorrect code is entered? A pop-up appears like in Figure 12. It states that the 
user gave an incorrect code and have two attempts left. Left until what? Since 
there is no specification available this is needed to find out, when the SIM PIN 
code is typed incorrectly again, results are shown in Figure 13. There is a clear 
indication that there is only one more attempt left before there is a need to 
contact operator to unlock the SIM card. 
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Figure 12: Incorrect PIN code inserted  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: PIN code interface warning after two failed PIN code attempts. 
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What can be considered a good negative test case for this feature? If the PUK 
code of the device that is used to unlock the SIM card is known, a test case could 
be written where the code is entered incorrectly three times and inspected if the 
card  really is locked. Then another (positive) case to follow is to unlock the card 
with the correct PUK code. Hence, the negative case is to try to unlock the card 
with incorrect PUK code. 
From experience in the software quality assurance it is easy to say that the 
negative testing is often overlooked and done inadequately. Software 
implementers are content if the feature works as intended. This is true with all 
features but security features can break the phone if they are done incorrectly.  
Trying out negative test cases can be limited to a single try since it may render 
the device under test unusable. 
Can something else be attempted with the interface than just entering the 
SIM code? When pressing the “emergency call” word below it opens a new menu 
with new options. It will either allow users to make a call and then there is a 
button up there saying “emergency information”. What if the end user still only 
wants to make a call to friends instead of opening the SIM lock? Maybe this isn’t 
even the end users own phone. An error message is shown in Figure 14. To make 
sure all incorrect phone numbers are not accepted requires more testing, but at 
least that the end user can not call whoever they choose to. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Trying to call incorrect emergency number. 
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When the button above titled “emergency information” is pressed, it results 
in either “no emergency info set” or the set of visible info. The interface suggests 
that the information can be set from somewhere, not from the interface itself 
though. 
A summary of possible negative cases based on getting to know the feature 
is following: 
1. Try to insert incorrect SIM PIN. 
2. Try to insert incorrect SIM PIN until card is locked. 
3. Try to unlock SIM with incorrect PUK code. 
4. Try different incorrect emergency numbers. 
 
When researching and writing this part of the thesis, the SIM PIN interface of 
Android 8.0 was challenged. It is possible to enter unrestricted amount of 
numbers to SIM PIN. If thirty ones are hit into the SIM PIN query, it only says “SIM 
PIN verification failed”. The interface gives no indication while writing that there 
is something wrong with the length of end user input. If the emergency info menu 
has been opened first and then got back to SIM PIN query entering menu to enter 
the PIN code the first thing noticed when device opens is an open emergency 
info menu.  
Furthermore, if from the emergency dialer is returned directly back into the 
PIN code query there is a greyed half open drop down menu positioned above 
the PIN code query as shown in Figure 15. It is not operable but it should not be 
there in the first place.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Broken UI after returning from emergency dialer 
 
  
 
32 
 
The greyed menu possesses a security threat. The user can read device. The 
user can read the last calls and other private info from the menu. None of these 
did not break the secure structure of the device’s PIN, but are bringing security 
and privacy threats. 
4.2.8 Intentional Malicious Trials 
Negative aspects were already covered in the trials before. What if there is 
a desire to be more malicious. An attempt to use the emergency dialer to make 
personal phone calls was a move into that direction but it was an attempt to use 
the given interface in the wrong way. 
The malicious approach searches vulnerabilities that are not visible to the end 
user. The software that is flashed or installed to the device may have been altered 
to do tasks that are not supposed to do. Taking this approach requires patience, 
going through software specifications that are available and searching for known 
vulnerabilities found by others. 
The Verified Boot flow in the Android system [2017] is examined. It is a system 
designed into the Android OS to keep track that all booting components have 
been correctly signed. If signing is different the device should notify the end user 
that the device software has been altered. 
A clever malware which gets root privileges can hide itself into layers of 
software where it is really hard to detect let alone remove. The solution by Google 
to this is to divide software into 4k parts and sign those parts with the SHA256 
bit encrypted key.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. DM-verity hash table [Android verified boot. 2017]. 
 
As Figure 16 demonstrates 4k parts in layer 0 are gathered to upper level and 
the idea is that if the key in layer 3 (that is reasonably large chunk of code to be 
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inspected) are matching, all below keys are matching too. The upper level is the 
only layer that needs to be trusted. In addition, there is an OEM key for verifying 
the integrity of the boot image. 
 
The actual boot flow follows the structure in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: Google Verified Boot flow [Android verified boot. 2017] 
 
At first it checks that whether the device is in a locked or an unlocked mode. 
Unlocked device can be flashed freely with new software and the locked device 
can’t be flashed. The expected flow for the end user device with everything ok is 
to follow the left path to finish the boot. If that happens, the end user has no 
knowledge what is going on during the boot of the device. If the device discovers 
it is in unlocked state (that it almost never should be in a consumer device) the 
screen turns orange. If the end user chooses so the device can be booted still. For 
the device that is both locked and the boot partition fails the verification against 
the embedded key a red screen is displayed and only option for the device is to 
power off. If all key verification succeeds but the embedded OEM key verification 
fails the device can still be booted if end user chooses so. 
How can the existence of this kind of secure structure be verified and are there 
possibilities to exploit this? At first what the test engineer must do is to try to get 
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all states to appear with correct device states regarding the wanted solution. Next 
there are some parts of Android OS that are also inspected by verified boot like 
the splash screen. The splash screen is the picture shown before initial boot and 
final OS. Nokia used to have hands shaking there in their own OS. Can that picture 
be altered and is it caught? Pictures can be made to contain hidden executable 
code. Is it possible to change something in the boot images that does something 
end user does not want and still be able to go through the boot flow in green 
state?  
One of the big issues of Android OS is that even though devices such as 
Google Pixel XL receive monthly security updates the most of the other devices 
have not received them. For testing this means that if the software provider for 
the tested product has chosen not to use the Google official security updates or 
is lacking the latest the possibility to exploit those vulnerabilities need to made 
visible. Malicious approach is in a way made easy against most Android owners. 
4.3 Assessing Automation Possibilities 
Manual testing and testing trials are at this point of the testing process 
ongoing. The amount of manual testing is peaking, since the number of tests is 
high and there are no automated tests deployed to reduce the amount. It is good 
to look back into the tests already run and analyze the automation possibilities 
of them. The tools of the test automation are covered in the next pages. 
4.3.1 Used Methods 
Methods used to verify security features tend to be in the long run the same 
as verifying other software functionality. Usually in the definition phase and also 
for the large part in the execution phase there is more manual labor intensive 
testing involved. 
Automation methods are normal use of test automation toolset for test 
phases that can be automated. Specialized automated toolsets for security only 
exists as well. 
4.3.2 Manual Methods 
In manual methods, a test scenario is created that can’t be reproduced 
automatically. The test subject is analyzed to see what is the wanted functionality 
and what are the ways to verify it. System design and specifications play a high 
role in this. 
Zephyr is one of the tracking tools used for manual testing. When doing 
manual testing some kind of tracking of results is needed. These kinds of tools 
keep track of the test prerequisites and expected results as well. 
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4.4 Test Automation Common Tools 
Test automation example is created with a widely-known set of common 
tools. 
4.4.1 Jenkins 
Jenkins  [Wikipedia b. 2017] is an automation server that has been written 
using Java. It is a running application with a user-friendly web page interface. 
Jenkins is widely used because it can scale up to many different kinds of needs. 
Jenkins running machines can be divided into master server that handles big 
things and running slaves that do repetitive hard work. 
The work Jenkins is doing is called jobs. If many jobs are lined up at the same 
time the tool will line them up to a certain executing order. Jenkins interface of 
running a job is shown in Figure 18. 
Figure 18: Jenkins UI running a job [Wikipedia b. 2017] 
4.5 Virtualization Tools and Environments 
Jenkins and other test tools have been traditionally used in a way that the 
server where data and running programs are stored is a physical set up controlled 
and located in the using organization’s premises.  
This has advantages on protection of the data those servers contain. 
However, they present a problem with scaling of the operation and maintenance 
of the services. 
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Virtualization of testing tools offers many different helping points to this 
issue. Virtualization like name suggests is creating virtual computers that run in a 
certain environment with certain pre-set and changeable resources. The flexible 
changeability of given resources and the easy way to relocate those services are 
the key. This is often referred as scalability. 
Tools for virtualization include Ansible, Docker, Vagrant and VMWare. Let’s 
take a closer look into Ansible tool [Ansible. 2017]. A working testing environment 
needs a working issue tracking software. We are choosing Jira [Atlassian. 2018]  
for that. Jira is the foundation of Zephyr add on that was discussed earlier. Then 
we create a Jenkins master. This all can be put up into the master node with 
Ansible. The Ansible structure is described in Figure 19. There is a host inventory 
and a playbook against which the system is first set up. From the management 
node secure SSH connections are made to virtual Ubuntu machines. In this case, 
the set-up is done in some unnamed cloud provider, in a smaller scale it could 
even be someone’s own laptop if there are enough resources available. Scalability 
is visible in the picture. If there is a need one more virtual machine it just needs 
the resources to run it. Then again if there are excess machines they can be left 
out. 
 
Figure 19: Ansible virtual structure [Devopscube. 2017]. 
 
In a simple example about docker use there are readily made free images 
available for setting up personal Jenkins somewhere. I personally have usually 
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one Jenkins running in my computer to test out the latest things. The easiest way 
to set up Jenkins to a personal own machine is to download Docker Toolbox to 
the computer and find the ready-made image. 
 
Instructions for the system set up are following: 
1. Download Docker Toolbox from [Docker Toolbox. 2017]. Versions for 
MacOS and Windows are available. (MacOs was chosen) 
2. Start Docker Quick Terminal 
3. Type “docker pull jenkins” to open terminal 
4. Type “docker run -d -p 8080:8080 -p 50000:50000 -v 
$PWD/jenkins:/var/jenkins_home jenkins” 
5. docker ps (shows docker identification id) 
6. docker exec <identification id> cat 
/var/jenkins_home/secrets/initialAdminPassword -> Password prints out 
7. open browser http://192.168.99.100:8080/ 
8. insert password to the password prompt 
9. Jenkins UI opens 
 
Now a local Jenkins is running inside the real end user machine in a virtual 
container. The idea is that depending on the configuration this Jenkins could be 
running at a place that it is wanted. It might be a local server or some cloud 
providers given storage space. 
Virtualization is a mega trend in the world of software development now. 
Much like Agile methodologies have been. Virtualization allows small companies 
to start using issue tracking and test automation services in the early stages of 
the project. Unlike in the past where issuing a working environment for software 
development was an investment for actual server hardware. Now companies can 
start off with limited budget and scale up if and when needed.  
Cloud service providers such as Amazon (AWS) and Microsoft (Azure Cloud) 
offer start up services with a small fee and scale up. Larger corporations can 
change their ageing server room infrastructure into cloud service providers one 
and pay to them to upkeep and update the server hardware. And only use enough 
resources that are needed. 
4.6 Specialized Toolsets for Verifying Software Security 
A subset of test automation toolset is tools that are specifically designed to 
handle testing that is needed in the security field. They are tools that do repetitive 
tasks that would practically be impossible to execute by the end user. These tools 
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make possible to improve testing drastically in many areas that are important to 
security feature testing. 
4.6.1 Fuzzing 
Fuzzing [Takanen et al. 2006] is to send incorrect data to a system in order 
to crash it, therefore revealing reliability problems. This approach started as a 
school project as described in the book and has expanded from checking UNIX 
variant’s reliability issues to Windows OS and to mobile devices. 
Fuzzer generates numerous amount of incorrect data inputs that is sent to 
different drivers to see what kind of output the input has. It is particularly useful 
in finding not sanitized driver inputs and missing overflow protections. 
In the case of not sanitized inputs all inputs are taken as they come into the 
driver and assumption of the driver implementation is that all sent commands 
are formed correctly. By my personal experience this is really common with 
Microsoft Windows drivers. The fuzzer can easily break surprisingly many of the 
drivers just by sending incorrect inputs. 
Missing overflow protection happens when the memory calls are sent to receiver 
that contains the proper data but in the end of that data there is executable code 
that is missed by receiver. Then while the receiver saves the correct input part it 
also saves the executable data in the memory above the correct data. Then that 
code can be executed for malicious purposes since it is no longer in control of 
any real authority of the device’s intended memory handlers. 
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) lists the following open 
source fuzzing tools for different uses [Owasp a. 2017]: 
 Mutational Fuzzers 
- American fuzzy loop 
- Radamsa – a flock of fuzzers 
Fuzzing Frameworks 
- Sulley Fuzzinf Framework 
- rboofuzz  
Domain-Specific Fuzzers 
- Microsoft SDL MiniFuzz File Fuzzer 
- Microsoft SDL Regex Fuzzer 
- ABNF Fuzzer  
Commercial products 
- Codenomicon’s product suite 
- Peach Fuzzing Platform 
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- Spirent Avalanche NEXT 
- Beyond Security’s beSTORM product 
 
4.6.2 Penetration testing 
Essentially the penetration testing is smart fuzzing where as a fuzzing tool 
tries all kinds of wrong inputs including special characters and wrong length of 
gibberish into the testing target. A penetration test tool tries to be smarter. It 
sends data that has all the right qualities of being the right kind of input accepted 
by the testing target but it alters it in a malicious way to see if system inputs and 
outputs are sanitized. When doing penetration testing it is a bit closer to white 
box testing where the tester knows about the system design. Whereas in the black 
box testing like fuzzing where the structure of the system is an educated guess 
based on the feedback received from the inputs.  
A classic example of sanity check is to insert SQL code after a name when 
inputting it into database using the supplied interface. E.g. 
Insert first name: Teemu’); DROP TABLE students;— 
If that input is accepted as is there is a real risk that there is no students table 
anymore in the used database. To be able to try out this kind of input the tester 
has the knowledge that students table exists and it is not a part of any bigger 
structure e.g. <structure>.students. 
Tools are testing this kind and other inputs to see if some of the inputs results 
in a failure of database input sanitization. Similar kind of input sanitation failures 
can be applied in the smaller scale by trying out incorrect types of input to the 
fields of the input forms for example. 
The Owasp foundation [Owasp b. 2017] toolset contains tool Owasp ZAP that 
can be installed into the computer and then simply order to attack to a certain 
website. Owasp ZAP tool interface is given in Figure 21. Simplest way to use the 
tool is just to insert a website address and press attack in the Quick Start section.  
The attack keeps ongoing and can be stopped by pressing stop. Tools checks 
different layers of any given website and reports possible problems found. 
Example output is in Figure 22. Problems found are grouped by severity and 
further info on the problematic component location is available. Risk level is a 
product of Impact times likelihood and risk levels are low, medium and high. It is 
depicted in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20: Owasp ZAP impact levels [Owasp b. 2017]. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Owasp ZAP Quick Start interface [Owasp b. 2017]. 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Owasp ZAP problems report [Owasp b. 2017]. 
 
Penetration testing tools include [Software testing help. 2017]: 
- Metasploit 
- Wireshark 
- W3af 
- Back Track 
- Netsparker 
- Nessus 
- Burpsuite 
- Cain & Abel 
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- Zen Attack Proxy 
- Acunetix 
 
4.6.3 Load Testing 
Even though systems may operate well and as expected under normal 
operating conditions in especially network based operations they can be attacked 
to either Denial Operating Service (DOS) or to make them crash and maybe reveal 
more about their inner design. Crashed web pages sometimes reveal detailed 
information e.g. about the database structure. 
Load testing automates certain preset amount of load towards the system 
and observes their behavior. The page load times, crashes and not correct return 
inputs. 
Tools for load testing include: 
- Gatling 
- Apache Jmeter 
4.7 Testing Approach in This Thesis 
I personally noticed when taking a look into the ISTQB testing material during 
the writing of the thesis and then looking at the alternatives made me understand 
that I personally have drifted away from the process that I am trying to describe 
here on my every day work. Altering the thesis for these parts was useful for 
myself and it has itself helped me understand couple of the problems that I face 
in the real life. 
Software presented here are mostly under open source license. The selection 
is done to improve possibilities for the reader to apply the taken testing approach 
without committing to big up keeping costs. 
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5. Conclusions 
This study they must be subjected to critical examination against other studies in 
the area. Next suggestions for future studies are given. Then the thesis writing 
process from personal development point of view is explained.  
5.1 Usability of Secure Features 
As this thesis was written I examined quite a lot of usability studies, attended 
usability course arranged by UTA and read papers about disregarding usability in 
security features. I compared that to my work experience in the field. This was 
done to answer the research question “What are the aspects of the good 
usability?” and “How to approach a new feature that is supposed to be tested?” 
My personal experience matches the findings of Sasse and Flechais [2005] 
and Dhillon and others [2016]. Secure features do not appear to play an 
important role in the end user experience design plans. There is a plethora of 
them offered; they can be used if chosen so. All secure features appear to follow 
a plan where they are a need based service rather than a usable service. Many 
end users choose to use the less troublesome ones. In fact, the only time when 
security of the devices interests someone is a couple of days period after some 
serious security breach makes the headlines. 
The difficulty of using the secure features has started to play more important 
role nowadays with company-controlled handsets with strict security policies. It 
is a real-life example that if putting a correct fingerprint is unsuccessful (in an 
often unreliable fingerprint reader) after sauna and typing a correct complex 
password for a second factor authentication the device content will be wiped 
after five consecutive failed attempts. 
5.2 Comparing the Results to Other Studies in the Field 
Idrus and others [2013] review authentication methods. Theoretically they 
are examining the same methods as this thesis. They define the methods better 
than this thesis by separating terms authentication, identification and 
authorization. This thesis has a more straight-forward approach. While writing the 
thesis the usability was seen as the key element of the thesis where as Idrus and 
others see the methods itself as the most important study subject. This 
clarification of the stages was complementing the overall understanding and it 
was added to the beginning of authentication methods chapter. 
Seranath et al [2016] study the security indicator in fallback protection. The 
paper resembles many papers already covered in the literature review since it 
emphasizes the security part of the equation. The fallback itself has not been a 
part of this thesis even though it is quite much relying on the usability factors. 
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Fallback is usually not included directly into mobile friendly interfaces but it is 
rather a web based service. 
Braz [2011] reviews in her PhD thesis the same phenomena than this thesis. 
Braz covers computer systems mostly and briefly discusses mobile personal carry 
around devices, referred as Personal Digital Assistants. It is clear that Braz has 
made same literature based findings about the state of security being a need 
based implementation where usability, and the end user using the service have 
been left out of the design. The importance of the end user using the secure 
services is not a high interest. The thesis has been done six years ago and looking 
at the authentication methods in this thesis it seems clear that the situation didn’t 
changed a lot. Introduction of biometric scanners such as iris scanning, 
fingerprint and facial scanning as authentication methods form the biggest 
change. Furthermore, a mobile identification services such as Google 
Authenticator [Wikipedia a. 2018] introduce new ways for the end user to identify. 
As seen from literature review many of the usability based studies in this field are 
over a decade old. Authentication methods as such are virtually unchanged 
during that period. This field needs constant reminders to change the attitudes 
to more compliant to usability design.  
  
5.3 Future Studies 
This thesis scratches the surface of the usability of secure features. As 
presented before in the thesis the field of usability in the context of secure 
features is not very well covered. Secure features are still considered a need-
based service. If the usability of secure features is not further studied and 
emphasized to the software developers, it leaves more end users without usable 
security. As described in by Dhillon and others [2016] security developers and 
designers don’t see the importance of usability. Most likely a study that could 
show the benefits and even the bad implications of lacking usability would drive 
this study subject area further. There are few interesting ways to research the 
study subject further.  
A questionnaire can be sent to a group of mobile phone users about their 
preferred use of secure authentication methods. In addition to the preferred 
method the questionnaire could be also utilized to get detailed views on the 
usability of the features and the reason that led customers to choose the method. 
There is also possibility to start doing test setups for different types of new 
techniques for authentication or the improved versions of old techniques. The 
techniques introduced in the end of the Chapter 4 could provide a starting point 
for this and similar setups could be used that were covered in the future insights 
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part of the thesis. University of Tampere has project work and project 
management courses that could be utilized for creating these new 
implementations. Then a group of hands on testers could be chosen for case 
study part.  
5.4 Personal Thoughts 
The understanding of the concept of human computer interaction (HCI), 
usability and even the computer/mobile systems has been formed in a time when 
I have been able to use them from the first try outs until the current 
implementations. Work and education has supported my overall understanding 
of these complex processes. The claim could be made that the significance of 
electronic systems usability has been born under my own eyes. 
I got interested in computers at early age when devices such as Sinclair 
Spectrum and Commodore 64 were the must have devices. I started my 
computing career with a Salora Manager, a rebranded computer for Finnish 
market. When the transition into mobile technology started, I replaced my 
Commodore Amiga with a Motorola NMT handset. I was one of the early adapters 
of GSM technology with Nokia 2010 model in 1994 that even included the SMS 
sending feature as opposite of many devices of the time that only allowed you to 
receive the SMS messages. In 1997 I started to work for a growing mobile phone 
company, Nokia. Since then many different companies and products have been 
come and gone. 
I love the latest additions of iOS and MacOS. I am not missing those 37 
installation disks that I used to carry in my case for Word Perfect Office installation 
back in the early 90’s when I was working in an IT-helpdesk. 
When keeping a certain level of curiosity towards the latest development 
everyone can understand and appreciate the significance of this development to 
people’s everyday life. Hence as this thesis and other studies show the 
development is far from over. It is important to use Kaizen [Lean production. 
2017] style small step improvements in security area to open up possibilities and 
incentives for more ordinary end users to use better and more usable security. 
In its own part the verification and security loop hole finding and fixing is 
really important. This thesis tries to introduce a test engineer approach into minds 
of its readers.  
Also, the usability books referred in literature review have been eye openers, 
a sort of window, towards a world where there is a common logic in every-day 
objects.  
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The secure authentication methods are everyday object for all nowadays. 
They are used regularly on daily basis. They should work in a way that a conscious 
mind does not have to be utilized in operating them.  
There is a lot more to do in this field of study. I know a lot of security 
developers from my every day profession and I know that they are very intelligent 
people. However, they tend to be overly logical about their work. They assume 
the end users are logical about their choices and use the devices and secure 
features to provide the extra protection that has been implemented. The end 
users have a different logic in their choices. They have a desire to make devices 
as easy to use as possible. Even if logically thinking they then may affect their 
personal safety. To achieve the ease of use the end user’s personal data is left 
vulnerable for anyone that has access to their devices. 
During the last stages of the thesis writing I realized that even though I was 
first involved with mobile security over a decade ago I did not use any password 
protection on my mobile devices until 1,5 years ago. I thought drawing patterns 
and writing Personal Identification Codes was too invasive to my device use. What 
I did, since my device no longer has borders, I moved the security into the data 
of the device by changing all of my key personal data into the format that I only 
understood to mitigate possible security risks if the device were stolen. 
This all changed 1,5 years ago when mobile device manufacturers introduced 
fingerprint scanners. I instantly took it into use for my Samsung tablet, and later 
on into my iPhone and iPad, and lastly into my Apple Watch. I did not have any 
protection in my old Android driven smart watch. When realizing the issue now 
it seems really a dangerous way to use the device.  
But the usability just was not there for me. If we consider the fact that I should 
by profession be able to understand the risks and also have a better insight in 
using them what would average mobile users do?  
I see the studies during this thesis most helpful to my understanding and to 
my career aspirations. 
 
  
  
 
46 
References 
 
Android verified boot. (https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/). Last 
accessed 3rd October 2017. 
 
Ansible. (https://www.ansible.com). Last accessed 3rd October 2017. 
 
Apple Insider. 
(http://appleinsider.com/articles/17/09/25/macos-high-sierra-vulnerability-
may-let-unsigned-apps-steal-keychain-logins-in-plaintext). Last accessed 27th 
September 2017. 
 
Atlassian. Jira. (www.atlassian.com/software/jira). Last accessed 1st May 2018  
 
Eleni Berki, Chetan Sharma Chandel, Yan Zhao, and Sunil Chaudhary. 2017. A 
Comparative Study of Cyber-Security Knowledge in Higher Education Institutes 
of Five Countries. University of Tampere and Deerwalk Institute of Technology. 
 
Kristina Braz. 2011. Integrating a Usable Security Protocol for User 
Authentication into the Requirements and Design Process. PhD Dissertation. 
University of Quebec. 
 
Andrew Butterfield and Gerard Ekembe Ngongi. 2016. A Dictionary of Computer 
Science. Oxford University Press. 
 
Sunil Chaudhary. 2012. Recognition of Phishing Attacks Utilizing Anomalies in 
Phishing Websites. M. Sc. Thesis. School of Information Sciences, University of 
Tampere. 
 
Catalin Cimpanu. Researchers Devise 2fa System that Relies on Taking Photos of 
Ordinary Objects. 2017. 
(https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/researchers-devise-2fa-
system-that-relies-on-taking-photos-of-ordinary-objects/). Last accessed 31st 
October 2017. 
 
Lorrie Cranor and Simson Garfinkel. 2005. Security and Usability: Designing 
Secure Systems that People Can Use. O’Reilly Publishing. 
 
Deepnet security. 
(http://www.deepnetsecurity.com/authenticators/one-time-password/mobileid) 
Last accessed 8th December 2017. 
 
 
 
  
 
47 
Devopscube. 
(https://devopscube.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ansible-aws-dynamic-
inventory.png). Last accessed 5th October 2017. 
 
Docker Toolbox. (https://www.docker.com/products/docker-toolbox) Last 
accessed 14th November 2017. 
 
Gurpreet Dhillon, Tiago Oliveira, Santa Susarapu, and Mario Caldeira. 2016. 
Deciding between information security and usability: Developing value based 
objectives. Computers in Human Behaviour. Volume 61. Pages 656-666 
 
FFIEC. Authentication in the Internet Banking Environment. 
(https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf). Last accessed 10th 
January 2018. 
 
FiSTB. (http://www.fistb.fi/fi/etusivu). Last accessed 1st December 2017. 
 
David Kim, Paul Dunphy, Pam Briggs, Jonathan Hook, John Nicholson, James 
Nicholson, and Patrick Olivier. 2010. Multi-Touch Authentication on Tabletops.  
Proceedings in SIGHI conference pages 1093-1102. 
 
Forbes. How does apples new face id technology work. 
(https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2017/09/13/how-does-apples-new-face-
id-technology-work/#8b64abc2b7f4) Last accessed 5th October 2017. 
 
Getzephyr. (www.getzephyr.com). Last accessed 27th September 2017. 
 
ISTQB. (http://www.istqb.org/downloads.html). Last accessed 13th November 
2017. 
 
ISO 9564-1:2002. (https://www.iso.org/standard/29374.html). Last accessed 13th 
November 2017. 
 
Young-Hoo Jo, Seon-Yun Jeon, Jong-Hyyuk Im, and Mun-Kuy Lee. 2016. 
Security Analysis and Improvement of Fingerprint Authentication for 
Smartphones. Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute of 
Daejeon and Inha University. 
 
Lean Production. Kaizen. (https://www.leanproduction.com/kaizen.html). Last 
accessed 29th November 2017. 
 
Kristin Loberg. 2004. Identity Theft: How to Protect Your Name, Your Credit and 
Your Vital Information-- and What to Do When Someone Hijacks Any of These. 
Silver Lake Publishing. 
  
 
48 
 
Scott MacKenzie. 2013. Human-Computer Interaction: an empirical research 
perspective. Morgan-Kaufmann Publishing. 
 
Thrushna Nalam. 2015. RSS v2.0: Spamming, User Experience and Formalization. 
M. Sc. Thesis. School of Information Sciences, University of Tampere. 
 
Dinh Toan Nguyen. 2016. Web Security: Security Methodology for Integrated 
Website using RESTful Web Services. M. Sc. Thesis. School of Information 
Sciences, University of Tampere. 
 
Donald A. Norman. 2013. The design of everyday things. Basic Book Publishing. 
 
Joseph Ooi. 2015. IMSI Catchers and Mobile Security. EAS 499 Senior Capstone 
Thesis School of Engineering and Applied Science University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Opera. 
(https://blogs.opera.com/security/2016/08/opera-server-breach-incident/). Last 
accessed 5th October 2017. 
 
Owasp a. Fuzzing. (https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Fuzzing). Last accessed 
29th September 2017. 
 
Owasp b. 
(https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project). Last 
accessed 3rd January 2018. 
 
William A. Perry. 2006. Effective Methods for Software Testing: Includes 
Complete Guidelines, Checklists, and Templates. Wiley Publishing. 
 
RSA. 
(https://www.rsa.com/en-us/products/rsa-securid-suite). Last accessed 8th 
December 2017. 
 
Angela Sasse and Ivan Flechais. 2005. Usable Security: Why do we need it? How 
Do We Get It? O’Reilly Publishing. 
 
Software Testing Help. 37 Most Powerful Penetration Testing Tools (security 
testing tools). 
(http://www.softwaretestinghelp.com/penetration-testing-tools/). Last accessed 
29th September 2017. 
 
 
 
  
 
49 
Stickyminds. 
(https://www.stickyminds.com/sites/default/files/article/2012/XDD12629imageli
stfilename1.jpg) Last accessed 27th September 2017. 
 
Awanthika Seranath, Nalin Arachchilage, and B.B. Gupta. 2016. Security Strength 
Indicator in Fallback Authentication: Nudging Users for Better Answers in Secret 
Questions. International Journal for Infonomics. 
 
Russell Brandom. SMS two factor authentication hack. 2017. 
(https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/18/16328172/sms-two-factor-
authentication-hack-password-bitcoin). Last accessed 3rd October 2017. 
 
Ari Takanen, Jared D. Demott, and Charles Miller. 2008. Fuzzing for software 
security testing and quality assurance. Artech House. 
 
Zulkarnain Syed Idrus, Estelle Cherrier, Christophe Rosenberger, and Jean-
Jacques Schwartzmann. 2013. A Review on Authentication Methods. Australian 
Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 2013, 7 (5), pp.95-107. 
 
Wikipedia a. Google Authenticator. 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Authenticator). Last accessed 5th May 
2018. 
 
Wikipedia b. Jenkins. 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jenkins_(software)#/media/File:Ansible-playbook-
output-jenkins.png). Last accessed 28th September 2017. 
 
